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Long-term care (LTC) is one of the largest financial risks facing the elderly today, yet very 
few people—13 percent of current 65 year olds—insure against the risk. This lack of 
insurance coverage has spurred much work that tries to explain this phenomenon 
(Finkelstein et al., 2005; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Brown and Finkelstein, 2007; 
Brown et al., 2007; Brown and Finkelstein, 2008). It has also spurred public policy into 
action, with 24 states and the District of Columbia offering tax breaks for private long-term 
care insurance (LTCI) purchases as of 2008 (Goda, 2011). These policy changes, however, 
have not led to a widespread increase in coverage (Wiener et al., 2000; Meiners, 2001; 
Courtemanche and He, 2009; Goda, 2011). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
also included a now-defunct program, the Community Living and Supported Services 
(CLASS) Act, which would have created a new government-run LTCI pool.
In other domains of catastrophic insurance, studies have shown that after individuals 
experience the insurable risk, they are more likely to purchase insurance against that risk in 
the future (Kunreuther et al., 1978; Kunreuther, 1996; McCall et al., 1998; Browne and 
Hoyt, 2000; Gallagher, 2014). This response could be explained by behavioral heuristics, 
such as an increase in the salience of the risk, or by an increase in information about the 
insurable risk.
In the LTCI context, lack of experience with LTC could help explain the low demand for 
insurance. Experience could help overcome behavioral biases since people tend to dislike 
and delay discussions about becoming frail and needing assistance (Sperber et al., 
forthcoming). In addition, experience could fill several potential information gaps in the 
LTCI context: the likely need for LTC; the expense entailed in getting such care; the gaps in 
one’s existing insurance coverage for LTC; or, one’s family’s willingness to provide 
informal care. Any of these sources of incomplete information would lead to lower than 
expected LTCI purchases. Previous research has provided evidence of incomplete 
information in at least two of these domains. Bacon et al. (1989), Pauly (1990), and AARP 
(2006) report that most elderly believe that LTC expenses are covered by Medicare. Further, 
AARP (2006) found considerable underestimation of the costs of nursing home care among 
individuals age 45 and older. While Brown and Finkelstein (2009) highlight limited 
consumer understanding of both the insurance product and the expenditure risk as one of the 
top five reasons for low LTCI demand, there has been no empirical testing, to our 
knowledge, of the extent to which lack of information depresses LTCI purchase in the 
United States.1
To evaluate the role experience may play in LTC and LTCI decisions, we exploit variation 
between individuals who have someone close to them—a parent or in-law—who needs and 
uses LTC and those who do not.2 Individuals who have parents or in-laws who use LTC 
may be more aware of the risks and costs. This paper examines how parents’ and in-laws’ 
use of LTC impacts an adult child’s LTCI purchase decisions. Although we cannot 
1Zhou-Richter et al. (2010) assess the role of information among adult children on the demand for LTCI for their parents in Germany.
2While LTC can encompass many types of care arrangements, in the empirical framework, due to data limitations, we limit the term 
to only mean two types—informal care from children and nursing home care.
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completely disentangle whether the effects are driven by a change in information or 
behavioral economics explanations, we exploit variation in the person who needed care 
(parent or in-law), the type of care used (nursing home or informal care), and the person 
who provided informal care (the adult child him or herself or a sibling) to discern which 
explanations may be at play. We also analyze the mechanisms underlying any resulting 
change in LTCI holding by examining how expectations about the future change after a 
parent or in-law uses LTC. In particular, we analyze how a parent or in-law’s use of LTC 
impacts an adult child’s expectations about informal care from children and inheritance 
receipt.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes how experience with LTC via 
parents’ or in-laws’ use can affect expectations and LTCI purchase decisions. Section 3 
discusses the data and the sample in detail. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy. Section 
5 presents the results, in which we examine the impact of parents’ and in-laws’ LTC use on 
the adult child’s expectations about informal care and inheritance receipt, and on the 
purchase of LTCI, controlling for these expectations. Section 6 concludes that experience 
does matter in the decision to purchase LTCI. While the experience effect is slightly smaller 
than that of other policies tried, such as decreasing the Medicaid asset limits (Brown et al., 
2007) or the recent tax credits and partnership programs (Goda, 2011), it does not have the 
same associated costs to the federal or state budget.
2 How Experience Can Affect Expectations
In the specific domain of risk perception and insurance, previous work has shown that 
individuals who experience the insurable risk are more likely to purchase insurance against 
that risk in the future. Kunreuther et al. (1978) find that individuals who experienced 
property damage in a prior natural disaster are more likely to purchase flood insurance. 
Similarly, flood insurance purchases increase in areas that experienced a recent flood 
(Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Gallagher, 2014). Palm et al. (1990) found an increase in the 
perceived need for earthquake insurance after the Loma Prieta earthquake, and Kunreuther 
(1996) finds an increase in the demand for insurance following earthquakes more generally. 
Coe et al. (2014) find an increase in the stated demand for disability insurance among 
individuals who are informed about disability risks.
In the LTC literature, some studies have explored how knowledge about LTC or individual 
health risks impact LTCI demand behavior. For example, McCall et al. (1998) find that 
individuals who have a family member or friend that needs LTC are more likely to purchase 
LTCI, and Zhou-Richter et al. (2010) find that German adult children are more likely to 
want to buy LTCI for their parents after being informed about the population average risks 
and costs of LTC. Brown et al. (2012) find that individuals’ beliefs about the likelihood of 
not being able to live independently due to health problems were strongly correlated with 
LTCI coverage in the RAND American Life Panel. Meier (1999) formulates a theoretical 
model that shows individuals might wait to purchase LTCI to obtain more information about 
their own probability of becoming disabled as well as the costs of disability and associated 
care. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining how actual experience with LTC 
via a parent or in-law’s use of nursing home or informal care impacts LTCI purchase 
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behavior, exploiting variation in the relationship to the care recipient, type of care received, 
and who provided care.
Disentangling why experience with LTC matters in forming expectations and LTCI 
purchase decisions is often difficult with secondary data, but important in order to make 
policy recommendations. We explore three potential explanations below: (1) rational 
updating; (2) overcoming inertia and increasing salience; and, (3) overreaction to risks.
2.1 Rational Updating
The rational expectations model assumes that individuals form expectations using all 
available information and make optimal decisions that are based on (and consistent with) 
these expectations. When new information is learned, expectations about the future are 
updated, typically assumed in a Bayesian manner. The rational expectations model is 
consistent with the self-regulation model (Leventhal et al., 1992). The self-regulation model 
posits that individual understanding of disease is based on the individual’s rationalizations 
about its causes, consequences, timeline, trajectory, prognosis, and their ability to control, 
treat, and prevent the illness. Individual understanding is informed by beliefs, experiences, 
family, friends, health care practitioners, and the media. Importantly, both positive and 
negative experiences or information can alter one’s beliefs, coping strategies, and behavior.
The rational expectations model posits that LTC use by parents and parent-in-laws 
(hereafter, the G1 generation) could impact one’s knowledge of LTC risks and costs. Under 
this framework, we hypothesize that LTC use by the G1 generation will have an information 
spillover effect and change the insurance status of their adult children. If individuals are 
already fully-informed about the risks they face and their associated costs, then LTC use by 
parents or in-laws will have no effect on their own expectations about future use or their 
financing plan. However, if individuals learn during their parents’ or in-laws’ LTC spell, 
expectations about future care use, lifetime income, and preferences for different types of 
care delivery may evolve, and the decision to purchase LTCI to prepare financially for these 
future needs may change.
We try to disentangle the type of information that is learned through the G1 generation’s use 
of LTC by exploiting across-family variation in who provides care, who receives care, and 
the type of care received. For example, helping or watching anyone navigate the LTC 
system will make one aware of the complexities they may face during their own aging 
process. Thus, information about the aging process and the costs associated with care are 
revealed if any individual in the G1 generation uses any type of LTC. Additional 
information can be learned as outlined below.
• Relationship to care recipient: Genetic information is revealed through a health 
decline of a parent, but not an in-law. Because of the common genetic link, a 
parent’s health decline may differentially influence an adult child’s expected need 
for future LTC compared to an in-law’s health decline.
• Type of care received: Whether a parent or in-law receives formal or informal care 
could impact an adult child’s expectations or preferences about his or her own 
future care needs. The type of care received may provide information about the 
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costs of care, the willingness of family to provide informal care, and the ability to 
meet LTC needs in an informal setting.
• Provision of care: As a result of providing informal care to a member of the G1 
generation, an individual may experience and learn about caregiver burden, which 
has many definitions in the gerontology literature (Zarit et al., 1980) or conversely, 
caregiver gain, such as role satisfaction (Tarlow et al., 2004), improved 
relationships with a parent (Roth et al., 2005), and the knowledge that one has 
fulfilled a familial duty (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004). Providing care to a 
parent or in-law may also provide a signal that an adult child expects his or her own 
children to do the same (i.e. the demonstration effect) (Stark, 1995; Cox and Stark, 
2005). We hypothesize that an individual who provides informal care will learn 
more about this aspect of LTC than non-care providing adult children.
One complicating factor is that parents’ or in-laws’ use of LTC might impact one’s lifetime 
income expectations through changing the size or the probability of receiving a bequest; 
thus, we also examine how expectations about inheritance receipt vary with LTC use in the 
G1 generation. For example, a G1 member receiving informal care might change 
expectations about who gets the bequest if the exchange motive is operative (Bernheim et 
al., 1985; Norton and Van Houtven, 2006), while formal care use may impact the expected 
size of the bequest, particularly if such care is paid out-of-pocket.
Further, we examine whether there are direct or indirect effects of the G1 generation’s use of 
LTC on how adult children plan to pay for their future care needs by analyzing their 
decision to purchase private LTCI. The hypothesized changes in the perceived need for 
insurance described above are consistent with Bayesian updating within a rational 
expectations framework (Viscusi, 1991). In other words, individuals gain new information 
from the G1 generation’s use of LTC and update their own expectations, which could result 
in a change in behavior in the form of purchasing LTCI.
2.2 Overcoming Inertia and Increasing Salience
Changes in expectations and LTCI purchase decisions among individuals with more 
experience with the insurable risk may also be consistent with models proposed in 
behavioral economics, based on the psychology literature. Two likely concepts at play in the 
LTC and LTCI context are inertia and salience.
• Inertia: When faced with the difficult calculation of determining whether and how 
much LTCI is needed, individuals may simply follow the status quo from a 
previous decision or avoid making a decision altogether. In this case, the status quo 
is non-purchase, and could lead to lower levels of insurance rates than predicted to 
be optimal from a rational expectations standpoint. Having someone in the G1 
generation use LTC may be a precipitating event to end the inertia.
• Salience and availability bias: “Salience refers to the phenomenon that when one’s 
attention is differentially directed to one portion of the environment rather than to 
others, the information contained in that portion will receive disproportionate 
weighting in subsequent judgments” (Taylor and Thompson, 1982). Having 
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someone in the G1 generation use LTC may increase the salience of LTC and LTCI 
decisions for the adult child. The behavioral economics literature has noted that 
salient risks (even low-probability ones) are often given excessive weight and result 
in excessive reactions by individuals. Closely related, availability bias means 
individuals base the probability of an event on the ease with which instances of the 
event can be brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Thus, changes in 
expectations and LTCI purchase in response to LTC use by the G1 generation may 
reflect adult children putting excessive weight on LTC risks because they are 
salient or can be brought to mind easily, rather than a rational updating of the 
information set.
2.3 Changing Risk Perception
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) observe that people have “limited ability to comprehend and 
evaluate extreme probabilities.” Indeed, the literature has found that individuals tend to 
overestimate low-probability events. Coe and Webb (2009) suggest that people tend to 
overestimate their probability of receiving an inheritance; however, previous work such as 
Lindrooth et al. (2000) and Taylor et al. (2005) suggests that average nursing home 
utilization predictions from individuals in the early years of the AHEAD data are fairly 
accurate compared with their actual nursing home usage 5 to 7 years later. Another 
phenomenon concerning probability perception is the tendency to overreact to fearsome 
risks and overestimate their frequency (Sunstein and Zeckhauser, 2011). Thus, changes in 
expectations and LTCI purchase following LTC use by the G1 generation may capture adult 
children excessively reacting to LTC risks.
It is difficult to separately identify the mechanisms underlying behavior changes following 
experience with LTC using secondary data sources that do not specifically ask why 
individuals changed their expectations or decision to purchase LTCI (or without a full 
parameterization of the decision-making model). However, by exploiting variation in the 
relationship to the care recipient, the type of care received, and who provided care, we might 
take some steps to disentangle the different explanations. For example, within a married 
household with shared decision-making, it is difficult to use the salience argument to explain 
large differential responses to in-laws using LTC and parents using LTC. We generally 
discuss our findings within the context of the rational expectations and Bayesian learning 
framework, but we acknowledge that for the most part, we cannot completely rule out or 
disentangle the role of the behavioral tendencies and non-learning responses outlined above.
3 Data
We use data from the 1998 through 2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
In 1992, the HRS sampled the non-institutionalized 51 to 61 year old U.S. population, and 
respondents have been followed every two years. We limit the years of data due to question 
differences across years. We start with the 1998 wave due to the inconsistent definition of 
LTCI in the survey and other key variables prior (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), and end 
in 2006 due to the lack of questions about inheritance expectations in later years.
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We create a respondent-level dataset consisting of respondents from the original HRS cohort 
and their spouses. We limit our analysis to individuals over the age of 50. Given we are 
interested in expectations about informal care from children, an individual has to have at 
least one living child to be included in the sample. Since we are interested in LTCI purchase, 
an individual must not have LTCI in the prior survey wave and must be able to pass the 
LTCI underwriting screening as of the prior wave (i.e. no IADLs or ADLs and no recent 
strokes).3,4 Table A1 in the Appendix details our sample restrictions. Our final estimation 
samples consists of 26,979 person-wave observations, representing 8,349 unique 
individuals.
3.2 Variables
First, we analyze how G1 LTC use impacts expectations about informal care and inheritance 
receipt. Regarding future informal care expectations, the HRS asks, “Suppose in the future, 
you needed help with basic personal care activities like eating or dressing. Do you have 
relatives or friends (besides your [husband/wife/partner]) who would be willing and able to 
help you over a long period of time?” If the respondent says yes, he or she is asked, “What is 
the relationship to you of that person or persons?” Respondents are allowed to indicate 
multiple options from among a variety of people listed. If respondents include “child/child-
in-law” in the follow-up, we code them as expecting children to provide informal care in the 
future.
Having a parent use LTC could impact expectations about future inheritance receipt (either 
the amount or the likelihood of receiving one), and consequently impact one’s expectations 
about lifetime wealth. Such changes could subsequently impact the financial planning that 
he or she may need to undertake to handle LTC expenses in the future, including the choice 
between self-insuring and having private LTCI. The HRS asks, “What are the chances you 
will receive an inheritance during the next 10 years?” Individuals can respond with a 
probability between 0 and 100, which we rescale to be between 0 and 1.5
Second, we test the influence of the G1 generation’s use of LTC on LTCI purchase, 
controlling for the adult child’s expectations. Regarding LTCI, the HRS asks, “Not 
including government programs, do you now have any long term care insurance which 
specifically covers nursing home care for a year or more or any part of personal or medical 
care in your home?” Individuals can respond yes or no. We define purchase to mean an 
individual answered yes to the LTCI question in the current survey wave but answered no in 
the prior wave. As mentioned earlier, we examine purchase only among individuals healthy 
enough to pass the underwriting screening as of the prior survey wave.
3IADLs are instrumental activities of daily living which include food preparation, housekeeping, managing finances, taking 
medication, among other activities. ADLs are activities of daily living, which including bathing, dressing, eating, toileting, and 
transferring (walking).
4We focus on LTCI purchase and not LTCI coverage to ensure the potential information gained from G1 LTC use occurs before the 
LTCI purchase.
5In 2006, the question wording changed to “What are the chances that you (or your [husband/wife/partner]) will receive an inheritance 
during the next 10 years?”
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The primary explanatory measures of interest are whether parents and in-laws received LTC 
and which type of care. We can identify informal care and nursing home care use of the G1 
generation. The HRS asks respondents where each of their parents and in-laws currently 
lives, with one of the possible responses being in a nursing home. In addition, if a parent or 
in-law has passed away since the prior survey wave, the HRS asks respondents whether that 
parent or in-law ever lived in a nursing home. We categorize parents or in-laws who 
currently live or ever lived in a nursing home as having utilized nursing home care.6
In order to measure informal care provided to the G1 generation, the HRS asks each 
respondent if he or she and his or her spouse spent a total of 100 or more hours in the last 
two years helping each parent or in-law with “basic personal activities like dressing, eating, 
and bathing.” The survey then asks who was helped and how many hours of care the 
respondent, and separately his or her spouse provided. The survey also asks which siblings 
and sibling in-laws, if any, provide help with these tasks.7
4 Empirical Strategy
In order to examine the effect of LTC use of the G1 generation on the adult child’s 
expectations about informal care provision from his or her children, we estimate the 
following equation using a logit model:
(1)
where ExpectICt is an indicator variable for whether individual i at time t expects that his or 
her children will be willing to provide informal care in the future.
Ait is a vector of LTC received by parents and in-laws, measuring if LTC was ever provided 
before or during time t. In our estimation, we consider three separate vectors of LTC 
received by the G1 generation to delineate across types of information provided: (1) Any 
parent or in-law receives any type of LTC; (2) Any parent or in-law receives nursing home 
care versus any parent or in-law receives informal care; (3) Own parent uses nursing home 
care; own parent receives informal care from the respondent; own parent receives informal 
care from the respondent’s siblings, and the three in-law correlates. Hit is a vector of the 
adult child’s health information, included to capture risk factors for future LTC needs. This 
vector includes the number of ADLs, the number of IADLs, an indicator for a low cognition 
score, the number of chronic conditions, an indicator for incontinence problems, and 
indicators for whether the adult child has previously used nursing home, home health, or 
informal care in the past two years. ICit represents the potential informal care network 
available to the respondent (besides a spouse) including the number of male and female 
children, the number of living siblings, the number of co-resident children, and the number 
of children living within 10 miles (excluding co-resident children). The individual-level 
characteristics included in the vector Zit are age, age squared, gender, race, and education 
6The HRS does not contain information about formal home health care use of parents or in-laws. As a result, unfortunately, we cannot 
analyze how G1 generation use of formal home health care affects expectations or LTCI purchase.7We do not include help with chores, errands, or transportation in our definition of informal care in order to keep the definition 
consistent between respondents and siblings, for whom we only know about personal care provision.
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categories (less than high school, high school, and at least some college) for the respondent 
and his or her mother and father. We also include an indicator for being married, being 
divorced, and an interaction term between gender and divorced, as well as an indicator for 
whether all parents and in-laws are deceased. Fit is a vector of financial information. This 
includes annual financial wealth quartiles, annual housing wealth quartiles, whether the 
respondent and his or her spouse have assets in a trust, whether the respondent has a will 
that benefits his or her children, and whether the children hold the deed to the house. Last, 
we include survey wave indicators, wt. The standard errors are clustered at the individual 
level to account for repeated observations.
To analyze the effect of LTC use of the G1 generation on the adult child’s reported 
probability of receiving an inheritance, we estimate the following fractional logit model:
(2)
where ExpectInherit is individual i’s self-reported probability at time t of receiving an 
inheritance, taking on values from 0 to 1 inclusive, and
(3)
Ait, Hit, ICit, Zit, Fit, and wt are as defined above. The fractional logit model developed by 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) accounts for the fact that the dependent variable is a 
proportion and can take on values of 0 or 1.
We then examine the impact of the G1 generation receiving LTC on LTCI purchase, adding 
expectations about future informal care and inheritance receipt to the regression in order to 
disentangle the direct effect of experience on LTCI purchase from the indirect effects that 
operate via changes in expectations. Therefore, we estimate the following logit model:
(4)
where LTCIit is an indicator variable for reporting having an LTCI policy in period t 
conditional on not having one in period t – 1. Ait, ExpectICit, ExpectInherit, Hit, ICit, Zit, Fit, 
and wt are as defined above.
5 Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics from our estimation sample. About 50 percent of 
the sample expect their children to provide informal care in the future. The average expected 
probability of receiving an inheritance in the future is 15 percent. Approximately 5 percent 
of the sample ever purchases LTCI during the period we consider. Almost 70 percent had 
some interaction with the LTC system via their parents or in-laws. About 52 percent of the 
G1 generation used a nursing home while 42 percent used informal care (these are not 
mutually exclusive options).
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The average age in the sample is almost 65. There are slightly more females than males, and 
74 percent of the sample is married. Very few of the respondents have already used LTC 
themselves—likely reflecting the sample selection criteria of being able pass the LTCI 
underwriting screening. Not even 1 percent of the sample has used informal or nursing home 
care, but almost 7 percent has used formal home health care in some capacity.8
On average, the sample has many potential informal care providers. As mentioned earlier, 
almost three-quarters of the sample is married, and individuals have almost 3 living siblings, 
2 sons, and 2 daughters, on average. In addition, one of the respondent’s children lives 
within 10 miles, on average.
Table 2 presents the marginal effects and standard errors from the logit model estimating the 
impact of G1 LTC use on whether an individual expects his or her children will provide 
informal care in the future.9 Column 1 presents the marginal effects from the model 
estimating the effect of any G1 member using any type of LTC. Column 2 breaks down G1 
LTC use between nursing home and informal care. Column 3 presents the results when G1 
LTC use is broken down into six categories: parent uses nursing home care, respondent 
provides informal care to parent, respondent’s sibling provides informal care to parent, and 
the three in-law correlates.
We find evidence that an individual’s expectations about informal care from their children 
or children-in-law are impacted by nursing home use of the G1 generation, and this effect is 
driven by the respondent’s own parent’s nursing home use. If the respondent’s parent uses a 
nursing home, he or she is 2.7 percentage points less likely to expect his or her child will 
provide care in the future. This result is consistent with the demonstration effect. If an 
individual’s parent uses a nursing home, that individual has not signaled that he or she 
expects or prefers to receive informal care from his or her children, which may decrease 
expectations about future informal care receipt. This result is also consistent with some of 
the behavioral responses outlined above. For example, if the parent’s use of nursing home 
care is salient or can be brought to mind easily, individuals might give disproportionate 
weight to the probability of using nursing home care in the future, and consequently report 
that they do not expect informal care. However, it is harder to use salience or risk perception 
as an explanation for the large difference in effects of in-law versus parental use of nursing 
home care on informal care expectations.
Next, we explore the effect of G1 LTC use on the self-reported probability of receiving an 
inheritance. Marginal effects and standard errors from the fractional logit model are 
presented in Table 3. We find that the direction of the effect depends on the type of care the 
G1 generation utilized. After an individual’s parent uses nursing home care, he or she 
decreases expectations about future inheritance receipt by 2.9 percentage points. If a 
respondent provides informal care to his or her own parent, he or she increases inheritance 
8While controlling for prior LTC use seems logical when estimating expectations about future informal care, using LTC oneself likely 
informs individuals about LTC costs and probabilities above and beyond the information set learned from the G1 generation receiving 
LTC. We have rerun our baseline equations eliminating those with their own experience with LTC, and we find quantitatively similar 
results which we discuss later.
9The coefficients and marginal effects of the control variables are largely as expected. Full results are available upon request.
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expectations by 1.4 percentage points, but if a sibling-in-law provides care to the 
respondent’s in-law, he or she decreases inheritance expectations by 1.7 percentage points. 
The decrease in expected inheritance receipt after a parent uses nursing home care may be 
explained by the child observing that there is less wealth to inherit as a result of the parent 
spending down to qualify for Medicaid or to pay for nursing home care out-of-pocket. The 
finding that informal care provided to a parent by the respondent increases the likelihood of 
receiving an inheritance, while sibling-in-law provision of informal care to an in-law 
decreases that likelihood suggests that individuals believe an exchange or bequest motive is 
operative (i.e. that individuals who provide care will be rewarded with a bequest).
We analyze the effect of LTC use among the G1 generation on LTCI purchase, controlling 
for informal care and inheritance expectations, to examine if there is a direct effect of 
experience on LTCI purchase. Results are shown in Table 4. In Column 2, we find having a 
G1 member use a nursing home increases the probability of LTCI purchase by 0.9 
percentage points. In particular, having a parent use a nursing home increases the probability 
of LTCI purchase by 0.8 percentage points and having an in-law use a nursing home 
increases the probability of purchase by 0.6 percentage points, though the latter effect is 
marginally significant (p = 0.053). Given that these effects are not statistically different from 
each other, our results suggest that by observing someone in the G1 generation receive 
nursing home care, the adult child changes his or her financial planning strategy to handle 
future LTC expenses. This change might be driven by information learned about the costs of 
nursing home care and the lack of public insurance coverage for nursing home expenses. It 
is also consistent with behavioral responses. If individuals typically follow the status quo of 
non-purchase, seeing a G1 member use nursing home care may be the impetus to end that 
inertia. It is important to note that informal care does not trigger the same response. This 
could be due to different information learned through informal caregiving versus nursing 
home care regarding formal care expenses. Further, it is suggestive that the increase in LTCI 
purchase probability is not only driven by an overreaction to low-probability risks.
Interestingly, we find individuals who expect their children will provide informal care for 
them in the future are 0.6 percentage points more likely to purchase LTCI. While this result 
is unexpected, it might reflect that some individuals who know or expect that their children 
will provide care want to avoid burdening their children as diseases progress and purchase 
LTCI. For example, qualitative work suggests that parents want their children to provide 
“support but not be burdened” should the need for LTC arise (Sperber et al., forthcoming). 
This result may also reflect that individuals who expect their children to provide informal 
care have already had discussions about future LTC alternatives and are relatively more 
forward-looking, leading them to purchase LTCI.
We find inheritance expectations have no significant effect on the probability of purchasing 
LTCI. Given the median inheritance in the U.S. is less than one year of average nursing 
home costs, this non-result is not surprising (Wolff and Gittleman, 2014).
Since G1 nursing home use decreases expectations about informal care receipt, and these 
expectations influence LTCI purchase, we run a simple counterfactual exercise to estimate 
the total effect G1 nursing home use has on LTCI purchase probability. We use the 
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estimated models to predict a counterfactual case where no one had a member of the G1 
generation use a nursing home and then a separate counterfactual where everyone had a G1 
generation member who received nursing home care.10 We perform the counterfactual on 
the informal care and inheritance expectations equations, and then on the LTCI purchase 
equation accounting for the expectations as well as the direct effects of G1 nursing home use 
on LTCI purchase. This counterfactual exercise suggests that having either a parent or an in-
law use nursing home care increases LTCI purchase probability by 0.7 to 0.8 percentage 
points. One interpretation of this finding is that most of the information learned through 
these experiences is about LTC more generally. This information could be about the costs of 
LTC, the incomplete insurance for these costs, or about general aging processes. Given that 
the effect is somewhat similar regardless of the relationship with the G1 care recipient, new 
information about one’s own genetic predisposition in the aging process may play a role but 
not an especially large one in the decision to purchase LTCI. Alternatively, this finding 
could indicate that having a G1 member use nursing home care provides the impetus to take 
action and to buy LTCI. Individuals without this “reminder” may delay, possibly to the point 
where they no longer meet the screening criteria for coverage.
5.1 Heterogeneity
Brown et al. (2007) and Brown and Finkelstein (2008) highlight that Medicaid, while 
means-tested, provides considerable insurance coverage for LTC risks for those in the lower 
portion of the wealth distribution, and thus the demand for LTCI may be crowded out by 
public insurance. Thus, wealth may be an important source of heterogeneity in the responses 
to learning about LTC. To test for this heterogeneity, we reestimate the expectations and 
LTCI equations only on the top half of the wealth distribution. In Table 5, we present results 
for the more detailed breakdown of G1 LTC use.11 We find the impact of G1 LTC use on 
informal care expectations is similar to that of the baseline. While we again find that a 
parent using a nursing home decreases an adult child’s self-reported probability of receiving 
an inheritance, we no longer find the respondent’s provision of care to a parent or a sibling-
in-law’s provision of care to the respondent’s in-law significantly impacts that probability. 
Instead, we find siblings providing care to the respondent’s parent increases the respondent’s 
inheritance expectations. Individuals may believe the exchange motive is operative, but 
informal care provided by siblings might impact the relative size of the expected inheritance 
between siblings, not the probability of receiving an inheritance.12 Similar to the baseline 
results, nursing home care received by the respondent’s parent increases the probability the 
respondent purchases LTCI. We also find the impact of an in-law’s use of nursing home 
care more significantly increases the probability of purchasing LTCI compared to the 
baseline estimates. Seeing a parent (or in-law) use nursing home care may provide important 
information about the costs and insurance coverage of such care, which may be especially 
important for relatively wealthy individuals who are less likely to qualify for Medicaid and 
10More specifically, we separately predict two counterfactual cases where no one versus everyone: (1) had a parent use nursing home 
care; (2) had an in-law use nursing home care.
11The results for the broader breakdowns of G1 LTC use are available upon request.12It is important to note that we only observe expectations about receiving an inheritance, not about the amount of the inheritance, and 
thus the identity of the informal care provider may be less important for the extensive margin expectation. Previous work suggests that 
parents often leave the exact same amounts to children in a will, regardless of informal care provision (McGarry, 1999).
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more able to afford the LTCI premiums, prompting them to purchase LTCI. Interestingly, if 
a respondent provided informal care to an in-law, he or she has a significantly lower 
probability of purchasing LTCI. Providing care for an in-law might signal that the individual 
places heavy weight on reciprocity and familial responsibility norms, and thus, has a 
preference for informal care over formal care, leading to a decreased probability of LTCI 
purchase. Those with relatively more wealth who especially value responsibility norms and 
are altruistic may be more willing to self-insure against LTC in the hopes of leaving a large 
incidental bequest should LTC go unused. Lockwood (2013) finds bequest motives, where 
bequests are assumed to be luxury goods, increase savings and decrease LTCI purchases, 
especially for individuals in the top half of the wealth distribution.
We also explore heterogeneity in the effects by the age at which the G1 generation member 
first received LTC. We create an indicator variable for the G1 member being 80 years old or 
younger versus older than 80 years old when care was first received.13 We interact this 
indicator variable with our measures of G1 LTC use. Results are available upon request but 
we provide a discussion of our findings for the more detailed breakdown of G1 LTC use 
below.
Overall, we find fairly consistent effects based on the age at which a parent or in-law starts 
receiving care. We find that if a parent was over 80 years old when he or she first received 
nursing home care, the adult child is 3.2 percentage points less likely to expect his or her 
own children will provide informal care in the future, compared to no significant effect if the 
parent was young. However, the effects are not statistically different from each other. 
Inheritance expectations decrease regardless of the age at which the G1 member uses a 
nursing home or the age at which sibling-in-laws provide informal care to in-laws. These 
estimated effects are slightly larger for care that began when the parent was 80 years old or 
younger, although the difference between the effects is statistically insignificant. Intuitively, 
a parent who initiates LTC at a “younger” age has the potential for a longer care episode and 
more expenses, decreasing the wealth available to leave as a bequest. We find no significant 
age-related heterogeneity in the effect of parents using a nursing home on LTCI purchase 
decisions.
There are a few cases where we find evidence of heterogeneity of effects based on the age of 
LTC onset. For example, a respondent is more likely to expect an inheritance if his or her 
sibling provided care to an “older” parent, compared to no significant effect if the sibling 
provides care to a “young” parent. This finding is consistent with the idea that the expected 
care episode might be relatively short in duration, and thus there will be financial resources 
left to disperse. Regarding LTCI purchase, we find when a respondent provides informal 
care that started when the parent was “young,” the respondent is 1.4 percentage points less 
likely to purchase LTCI. This finding is consistent with the idea that informal care provision 
to younger parents represents more commitment to informal care and thus less demand for 
LTCI. It is also consistent with a financial drain story—providing care to younger parents, 
with potentially a longer disability spell, could make individuals unable to afford LTCI. 
13We selected 80 years old as the cutoff because that was the median age at which LTC began for the G1 generation in our sample. 
The average age was 79.5 years old.
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Further work eliciting individual expectations about length of care spell and the financial 
burdens of care provision would be needed to tease out these explanations.
5.2 Specification and Robustness Checks
To address the concern that families with G1 LTC use are different from families without 
any G1 LTC use, we rerun the regressions only on the subsample of individuals who have 
someone in the G1 generation who accessed LTC at some point. Thus, the identifying 
variation comes from pre- and post-G1 LTC use among LTC-using families. The results are 
quite robust, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to the baseline estimates.14
One may have concerns about the selection of control variables. In particular, prior LTC use 
of the respondent may be endogenous with respect to the expectations we consider as well as 
LTCI purchase, which would bias our results. We reestimate all the specifications excluding 
individuals who have previously used LTC themselves.15 While we still find a parent’s use 
of nursing home care increases the individual’s probability of purchasing LTCI, the 
marginal effect is slightly smaller and less precise than in the baseline. Overall, however, the 
results are robust to the exclusion of individuals who used LTC themselves.
Finally, one might be concerned about the age criteria used to select the sample. We have 
rerun all models restricting the sample to individuals age 65 and older, a “typical” age at 
which individuals may retire and begin LTC planning.16 Due to a drop in sample size, some 
of the effects of G1 LTC use on expectations and LTCI purchase are less precise, but are of 
similar estimated size relative to the baseline results. Consistent with the baseline results, we 
again find a parent’s nursing home use significantly decreases expectations about future 
informal care receipt and inheritance receipt, and increases the probability of purchasing 
LTCI. Results are available upon request.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of experiencing parents’ and in-laws’ use of LTC on an 
individual’s expectations about informal care and inheritance receipt as well as the 
probability of purchasing LTCI. We find that nursing home use has the largest and most 
significant impact on both individual expectations and LTCI purchase decisions. We find 
that individuals are more likely to purchase LTCI if a close relative has used a nursing 
home, even after controlling for expectations about the future. Supporting the evidence of 
Medicaid crowd-out highlighted in Brown et al. (2007) and Brown and Finkelstein (2008), 
the estimated effects of LTC experience are stronger among the wealthier half of the sample, 
who are less likely to be affected by Medicaid coverage for nursing homes.
14The results are available upon request.
15The results are available upon request.
16One benefit of this sample age restriction is that we can use the HRS question concerning individuals’ assessment of their 
probability of entering a nursing home in the next 5 years, which is only consistently asked across waves to individuals age 65 and 
over. We chose not to include this expectation in our baseline analysis because it would have imposed a substantial sample restriction 
and severely limited the age ranges for which we could analyze LTCI purchase behavior. However, when we repeat our analysis on 
the older individuals, with or without the nursing home entry expectation as an outcome and as an expectation that could affect LTCI 
purchase, we find qualitatively similar results to those of the baseline, although we lose some significance due to the drop in sample 
size.
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Our findings are interesting in light of the standard asymmetric information (AI) model and 
work by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) on LTCI. Standard AI models predict that in 
equilibrium there will be a positive correlation between the amount of insurance purchased 
and the occurrence of the risky event (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Dionne et al., 2001; 
Chiappori et al., 2006). Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) posit that two types of individuals 
may lead to violations in the standard model: individuals with private information that they 
are a higher risk than the insurance company expects (for example, due to unobserved health 
status); or individuals with private information that have a strong taste for insurance and are 
lower risk than the insurance company expects (i.e. risk averse individuals). Our analysis 
suggests that LTC use of parents and in-laws, particularly nursing home care, makes 
individuals change their expectations about their own use of LTC in the future, as well as the 
uptake of LTCI. This type of information has not been explicitly considered in the AI 
models.
Overall, the total estimated effect of a parent using a nursing home on LTCI purchase is 
about half of the previously estimated effects of potential policy levers, such as having all 
states lower their Medicaid asset test to the federal minimum (Brown et al., 2007), or the 
effects of state tax deductions on LTCI holding (Goda, 2011). However, unlike these 
policies, providing the information or the impetus to action that is equivalent to having a 
parent or in-law use a nursing home has no direct impact on state or federal revenues. Since 
the CLASS Act has failed, policymakers could look to information campaigns as potentially 





All HRS respondents in waves 1998-2006 48,404
Age 50 and over 47,241
Has living children 44,745
Informal care and inheritance expectations questions answered 37,298
Did not have LTCI in the prior wave 32,001
Healthy enough to pass underwriting screening as of the prior wave 27,066
LTCI question answered 27,066
Full set of control variables available 26,979
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Outcomes: Expectations and LTCI
 Expect informal care from children/children-in-law 0.505
 Probability of receiving inheritance 0.151
 Purchased LTCI 0.055
G1 Long-Term Care Measures
 Any G1 received LTC 0.689
 Any G1 received nursing home care 0.520
 Any G1 received informal care 0.422
 Parent used nursing home care 0.343
 In-law used nursing home care 0.298
 Parent received informal care from respondent 0.156
 Parent received informal care from respondent’s sibling(s) 0.219
 In-law received informal care from respondent 0.084
 In-law received informal care from respondent’s sibling(s)-in-law 0.176
Health Variables
 # of ADLs 0.073
 # of IADLs 0.021
 Low cognition 0.067
 Incontinent 0.148
 # of chronic conditions 1.504
 Ever used informal care 0.009
 Ever used formal home health care 0.067
 Ever used nursing home care 0.008
Financial Variables
 Has a trust 0.080
 Has children on deed to house 0.033








  Less than high school 0.227
  High school graduate 0.372
  Some college 0.401
 Mother’s education:
  Less than high school 0.539
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Variable Average
  High school graduate 0.278
  Some college 0.104
  Missing 0.078
 Father’s education:
  Less than high school 0.553
  High school graduate 0.226
  Some college 0.114
  Missing 0.107
 All parents and in-laws deceased 0.548
Informal Care Network Variables
 # of living siblings 2.850
 # of male children 1.850
 # of female children 1.773
 # of co-resident children 0.293
 # of children within 10 miles 0.982
# of person-wave observations 26,979
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Table 2
Expectations about Future Informal Care Provision by Children
I II III
Any G1 used LTC
-0.0166* (0.00888)
Any G1 used nursing home care
-0.0223*** (0.00848)
Any G1 used informal care -0.00586 (0.00851)
Parent used nursing home care
-0.0267*** (0.00885)
In-law used nursing home care -0.00378 (0.00943)
R provided care to parent 0.0154 (0.0124)
Sibling provided care to parent 0.00122 (0.0111)
R provided care to in-law -0.0197 (0.0156)
Sibling-in-law provided care to R’s in-law 0.00104 (0.0118)
Observations 26,979 26,979 26,979
NOTES: R denotes the HRS respondent. Marginal effects are shown and the standard errors of those marginal effects are in parentheses. Standard 
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Table 3
Expectations about Future Inheritance Receipt
I II III
Any G1 used LTC -0.00525 (0.00522)
Any G1 used nursing home care
-0.0116** (0.00502)
Any G1 used informal care -0.00179 (0.00493)
Parent used nursing home care
-0.0294*** (0.00524)
In-law used nursing home care 0.00681 (0.00564)
R provided care to parent 0.0142** (0.00708)
Sibling provided care to parent 0.00960 (0.00631)
R provided care to in-law 0.0116 (0.00867)
Sibling-in-law provided care to R’s in-law
-0.0171*** (0.00632)
Observations 26,979 26,979 26,979
NOTES: R denotes the HRS respondent. Marginal effects are shown and the standard errors of those marginal effects are in parentheses. Standard 
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Table 4
Long-Term Care Insurance Purchase
I II III
Any G1 used LTC 0.00302 (0.00315)
Any G1 used nursing home care 0.00884*** (0.00299)
Any G1 used informal care -0.00425 (0.00297)
Parent used nursing home care 0.00837*** (0.00319)
In-law used nursing home care 0.00631* (0.00326)
R provided care to parent -0.00422 (0.00429)
Sibling provided care to parent -0.000931 (0.00401)
R provided care to in-law -0.00856 (0.00523)
Sibling-in-law provided care to R’s in-law -0.000329 (0.00409)
Informal care expectations 0.00591** (0.00290) 0.00604** (0.00290) 0.00610** (0.00290)
Inheritance expectations 0.00320 (0.00469) 0.00347 (0.00469) 0.00399 (0.00471)
Observations 26,979 26,979 26,979
NOTES: R denotes the HRS respondent. Marginal effects are shown and the standard errors of those marginal effects are in parentheses. Standard 
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Table 5
Expectation and Long-Term Care Insurance Purchase Results for Top Half of Wealth Distribution
Informal Care Expectations Inheritance Expectations LTCI Purchase
Parent used nursing home care
-0.0301** (0.0118) -0.0330*** (0.00795) 0.0121** (0.00486)
In-law used nursing home care -0.0166 (0.0122) 0.00408 (0.00813) 0.0103** (0.00493)
R provided care to parent 0.0232 (0.0167) 0.00674 (0.0105) -0.00680 (0.00656)
Sibling provided care to parent -0.0127 (0.0153) 0.0269*** (0.0101) 0.00239 (0.00645)
R provided care to in-law -0.0277 (0.0197) 0.0169 (0.0124)
-0.0194*** (0.00735)
Sibling-in-law provided care to R’s in-law -0.0152 (0.0152) -0.0121 (0.00959) 0.00372 (0.00649)
Informal care expectations 0.00274 (0.00463)
Inheritance expectations 0.0116 (0.00704)
Observations 13,493 13,493 13,493
NOTES: R denotes the HRS respondent. Marginal effects are shown and the standard errors of those marginal effects are in parentheses. Standard 
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